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Recent years have seen a debate over litigation reform grow in-
creasingly agitated. Attorneys, judges, academics, and politicians now
readily and regularly disagree about how or whether to combat the
debilitating litigiousness commonly purported to infect the American
Bar. Within this debate, few reform proposals have received as much
attention as "fee-shifting" provisions, which, in their most popular in-
carnation, reallocate litigation costs (particularly attorney's fees)
based on the outcome of the liability phase of a trial.1 This attention
is perhaps justified, given the nonuniformity of such rules among in-
dustrialized nations. For instance, in the British Commonwealth and
much of Continental Europe, the loser of the liability phase of a civil
trial generally bears the fees for both sides.2 Numerous other coun-
tries employ a partial fee-shifting approach, in which the losing party
bears a fraction of the prevailing party's fees.3 The United States and
Japan, in contrast, have historically eschewed such fee-shifting
schemes, except in cases of misconduct by one of the parties or where
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1. Indemnity rules that turn on the binary outcome of liability, while the most commonly
discussed, are by no means exclusive. Bebchuk & Chang, for instance, advocate the use of a fee-
shifting rule that turns not only on the liability decision, but on the "margin of victory" according
to some measurement norm. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard Chang, An Analysis of Fee-
Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of
Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (forthcoming 1996). Such proposals have not appeared as fre-
quently in practice, however, probably because of the problems inherent in measuring the mar-
gin of victory, especially in jury trials. On the other hand, Rule 11 and Rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure might arguably be seen as attempts to gauge the margin of victory using
"frivolousness" or the settlement process itself to infer margins of victory.
2. "Loser-pays" rules are prevalent in Australia, Germany, New Zealand, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and numerous regions of Canada and Switzerland. See WERNER PFENNIG-
STORF & DONALD G. GIFFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABILITY LAW AND COMPENSA-
ION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES 163-70 (Donald G. Gifford &
William M. Richman eds., 1991).
3. Among others, France, the Netherlands, and the Canadian province of Ontario follow
such hybrid rules. Id. at 163-65, 167.
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explicit legislation mandates otherwise.4 Despite this historical resist-
ance (or perhaps because of it), proposals to move in the direction of
a loser-pays rule have seized greater domestic attention of late.5
Most everyone agrees that indemnity rules can affect incentives,
thereby influencing (among other things) the selection of suits for liti-
gation, the effort expended by litigants, and the likelihood of settle-
ment. The respective directions and magnitudes of these various
effects, however, are complicated. 6
4. Id. at 166-67. In United States federal civil procedure, the classic case is Alyeska Pipe-
line Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Within state law, the only state still
to follow the English rule as a general matter is Alaska. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82 (mandating
scheduled fee shifting as a default rule).
Most of the statutory exceptions to the both-pay norm in the United States can be found in
civil rights cases, and are one-way (pro-plaintiff) in nature. Section 706(k) of Title VII has been
read by courts to create a default presumption in favor of awarding attorney's fees to a prevail-
ing plaintiff, but not to a prevailing defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); Christiansburg Gar-
ment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,421 (1978) (holding that a court may award attorneys' fees to a
prevailing defendant only when it can surmount a higher hurdle of demonstrating that the plain-
tiffs action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation," though not necessarily
brought in "subjective bad faith"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (ex-
tending the Newman doctrine to Title VII cases); Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S.
400, 402 (1968) (upholding the presumption that a prevailing plaintiff should be awarded attor-
neys' fees in a Title It case, and noting that Congress enacted the fee-shifting provision with the
express aim of "encourag[ing] individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial re-
lief"). Litigation falling within the remedies provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (includ-
ing Equal Pay Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act actions) is subject to an even less
discretionary one-way, pro-plaintiff fee-shifting scheme. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (prescribing that
the court "shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reason-
able attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action") (emphasis added).
5. Most recently, an early House version of the new Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 adopted a loser-pays indemnity rule for unsuccessful litigants whose case was "not
substantially justified." See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1995). The conference com-
mittee reconciliation of the House and Senate versions of the bill, however, largely eliminated
this provision. In its place, the Act merely makes attorney's fees the presumptive remedy for a
Rule 11 violation, and it mandates a Rule 11 analysis by the trial court as a matter of course. See
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 101 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1 and 78u-
4).
6. On the one hand, a British rule may deter a number of "low damage" and "nuisance"
suits, in which plaintiffs file trivial cases as a strategic attempt to extract a settlement offer. See
Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25
J. LEGAL STuD. 1 (1996) [hereinafter Bebchuk, A New Theory]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing
Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Suing];
Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REV. L. &
EcoN. 3 (1990); I.P.L. Png, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON.
539 (1983). On the other hand, a loser-pays system would encourage the filing of strong but low-
value suits, which would not have been brought under a traditional American rule, where each
side bears her own costs. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55
(1982). Moreover, when the outcome of a suit is uncertain, both of these fee-shifting rules will
induce inefficient "speculation" by potential plaintiffs. Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 1 (discuss-
ing this observation and arguing that the optimal legal response frequently would be to make fee
shifting contingent on the margin of victory).
A second area of concern among law and economics scholars has been the effect of indem-
nity rules on parties' marginal incentives to incur litigation costs. While the effect is formally
[Vol. 71:461
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This Article focuses on the third of these consequences, the likeli-
hood of settlement, and it extends a debate over the question of
whether the loser-pays rule promotes settlement. Specifically, it em-
ploys a game-theoretic analysis to propose a general account of the
relation between settlement negotiations and such fee-shifting rules.
This account supports more particular-but ostensibly less robust-
examples by others indicating the ineptness of the English rule as a
settlement-catalyzing device. In fact, I push the argument even fur-
ther, demonstrating that if maximizing settlement rates were one's
sole aim, then a more effective (albeit seemingly perverse) reform
proposal would prescribe that the winner, rather than the loser, should
bear the joint costs of litigation.
Before going into specifics, let me place the analysis in the proper
context. Evaluating the relationship between indemnity rules and set-
tlement requires some prior understanding of why settlement efforts
fail in the first place. Indeed, neoclassical economics suggests that
they should not: if both parties know that litigation entails socially
wasteful costs, then rational litigants should always resolve their dis-
putes through private bargaining notwithstanding the underlying fee-
allocation rule.7 The expected joint costs of litigating (not to mention
the risk of litigation uncertainty) represent large bargaining gains that
the parties would squander by failing to settle. And in fact, most liti-
gants are able to capture this surplus, as suggested by the fact that the
vast majority of civil cases settle before trial.8
unclear, a number of scholars have argued that a movement to the British rule would likely
increase the level of litigation costs for those suits which actually go to court when such "effort"
can affect trial outcomes. E.g., Avery Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English
Rule Really Cheaper? 3 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 143 (1987). This argument is fundamen-
tally rooted in two common observations. First, the marginal dollar spent on litigation imposes a
negative externality on the other party, since under a loser-pays system a litigant bears only a
fraction of her legal costs. Moreover, since parties do not generally bear the full cost of their
litigious expenditures, this externality will affect not only the opposing side, but society (qua
taxpayers) at large. Second, the parties' respective stakes in winning are higher (i.e., to avoid
paying one's opponent's fees), and thus the marginal benefit associated with winning increases.
A British-style rule tends to magnify the severity of both effects. For other specific applications
of these arguments, see Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee
Shifting Systems, 47 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 173 (1984); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement,
and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989). My analysis does not focus
on endogenous litigation effort choice, however.
7. This is, of course, an elementary (though oft-neglected) application of the Coase theo-
rem. See John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Re-
member the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1093 (1991) (giving an entertaining
and informative comment on the academy's inclination to forget the "positive" Coase theorem
when discussing fee shifting and settlement).
8. See, e.g., James Kakalik et al., Avoiding Gridlock: Strategies for Reducing Civil Delay in
the L.A. Superior Court, at xi (RAND Corp. ICJ Working Paper, 1990) (finding that 96% of civil
cases in Los Angeles settle before receiving their full-blown "day in court").
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Nonetheless, for those litigants whose efforts to settle are unsuc-
cessful, we are left with the challenge of explaining why. Three princi-
pal causes seem to emerge consistently in the academic literature: (1)
transaction costs prevent the parties from capturing the joint gains
from settlement; (2) one or both litigants place large intrinsic value on
litigation itself;9 and (3) cognitive barriers cause the parties' decisions
to deviate from standard economic assumptions of expected utility
maximization. 10 Although I will have something to say about the lat-
ter two possibilities later in this Article," my principal focus here is on
what many see as the most pernicious transaction cost barrier to nego-
tiation: asymmetric information.
12
Typically, each party to litigation possesses some private informa-
tion about the underlying "value" of the case. For instance, a defend-
ant may be relatively more informed about the extent of her
negligence, or a plaintiff about the extent of his damages. If a pri-
vately-informed party (or her attorney) is rational, she is likely to
have an incentive to use the proprietary knowledge to her own advan-
tage. By convincing her opponent that she is a "strong type,"'1 3 she
might extract settlement concessions in excess of what she would ex-
9. This might occur if, for instance, an individual plaintiff values access to the legal "pro-
cess" as a mechanism for providing a preferred forum for vindication, or simply to "tell one's
story." See Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation
and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996). Alternatively, it is possible that litigants har-
boring interpersonal antipathy would relish being able to impose legal fees on one another, even
though it may come at a substantial personal cost.
10. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) (delineating the systematic errors individuals often
make when placing decision weights on uncertain prospects); Edward J. McCaffery, Why People
Play Lotteries and Why it Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 71, 83-86 (summarizing the cognitive psy-
chology literature on excessive optimism and legal decisions, and applying it to the decision to
play lotteries).
The notion that "disagreement" about the likely outcome of a case could retard settlement
efforts has been long recognized in the law and economics literature. E.g., John P. Gould, The
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); H.S.E. Gravelle, The Efficiency
Implications of Cost-Shifting Rules, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1993); William M. Landes, An
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). This
Article does not follow such a route, opting instead to model settlement failure as a result of
private information of the parties. Note, however, that the latter approach is still capable of
generating equilibrium behavior in which parties with information indicating they have a
"strong" suit will act in a way that is consistent with "optimism," but without having to make
such optimism a fundamental in the model.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 60-71 and 82-83.
12. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Effort, Information, Settlement, Trial, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 30
(1995) (noting that informational asymmetries may persist not only at the filing stage of the trial,
but also through the discovery stage and later).
13. Consistent with the literature on adverse selection, I will frequently refer to the content
of a party's private information as her "type." Thus, for example, a plaintiff in a suit whose
privately-known level of damages is $98 would constitute a plaintiff whose "type" is equal to 98.
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pect through litigating. This incentive to misrepresent one's private
information can be wasteful, for it increases the probability of bar-
gaining failure or delay, even when it is obvious to all that there are
immediate gains from settlement.
Numerous law and economics scholars have commented on the
relationship between private information, settlement negotiations,
and the underlying fee-allocation rule. Some notable academics have
argued that moving in the direction of an English rule would, on aver-
age, have a beneficial effect on settlement. For example, Richard Pos-
ner has conjectured that a loser-pays rule will likely induce greater
truth-telling among litigants, because a "weak" litigant whose bluff is
called faces the joint prospects of both a losing case and responsibility
for her opponent's legal fees. So constrained, this argument goes, the
litigant would rather tell the truth than bear "the cost.., of exaggerat-
ing the probability of his prevailing.' ' 14
In contrast, a handful of commentators have produced stylized
examples demonstrating the reverse of Posner's intuitive argument, in
which the American rule dominates the English rule on settlement-
inducing grounds.' 5 While these counterexamples demonstrate a
powerful possibility, it is difficult to assess their generality. Indeed,
nearly all of them employ a specific bargaining procedure to analyze
the characteristics of a few particularized alternative fee-shifting
schemes. Such a methodology is problematic for at least two reasons.
First, litigants might well employ a completely different bargaining
procedure than the one studied. And second, there may be some
other type of liability-contingent fee-shifting scheme that would in-
duce even greater settlement rates than would the "usual suspects.' 16
Below I endeavor to unify and generalize the extant theoretical
approaches, arguing that the settlement-deterring attributes of the
English rule transcend the specific, discrete examples described
above. I demonstrate in a very general setting that when one or both
14. RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 572 (4th ed. 1992).
15. The most notable of these is Lucian Bebchuk. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Litigation and
Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984) [hereinafter Bebchuk,
Litigation]. Still others argue that the settlement rate may be independent of the fee-shifting
rule. See J.F. Reinganum & L.L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation
Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557 (1986). For other examples, see Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial
Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987); Bebchuk, Suing, supra note 6; P'ng, supra note 6.
16. This term refers to the four most commonly analyzed fee-shifting procedures: the
American rule; the English rule; the pro-plaintiff one-way fee-shifting rule; and the pro-defend-
ant one-way fee-shifting rule. As noted above, there is reason to be skeptical of limiting one's
analysis to these rules alone, given that numerous countries employ "hybrid" schemes that do
not fit easily into one scheme. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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parties has private information about the likely liability outcome of
trial, the English rule is less able than any other type of liability-based
fee-shifting rule to induce high rates of settlement. Moreover, I argue
that although the oft-discussed American rule and one-way indemnity
schemes tend to fare relatively better, there is a continuum of alterna-
tive schemes-including a "winner-pays" rule-that can induce even
higher settlement rates.
The intuition for this general argument lies in understanding how
the fee-allocation rule affects one's marginal incentive to lie about the
strength of her case. Under the American rule, in which fees are not
reallocated, this incentive comes solely from inducing one's opponent
to make a pessimistic inference about the expected judgment should
the case go to trial. Note, however, that this signal about the likely
judgment has no bearing on the amount of legal fees the opponent
should expect to pay; for under the American rule, if bargaining fails
each party will bear its own costs, regardless of the liability
determination.
When fee allocation does turn on liability, however, the signal
sent by a successful bluffer is relevant on an additional dimension.
Now, the bluffing party signals information not only about the relative
strength of her case, but also about the likelihood that she will ulti-
mately have to bear litigation costs. In a loser-pays fee-shifting sys-
tem, these two signalling concerns are fully complementary; by
successfully representing herself as having a strong case on liability, a
strategic bargainer can capture profits-often called "information
rents"-from two sources: (1) her opponent's pessimistic inference
about the expected judgement; and (2) her opponent's pessimistic as-
sessment about having to bear increased litigation costs. This second
source, ceteris paribus, increases the marginal benefit of bluffing vis-A-
vis the American rule.17
In contrast, under a "winner-pays" rule, these two signalling con-
cerns-while present-are countervailing rather than complementary.
Indeed, under such a rule, one's attempt to misrepresent the strength
17. The above argument exposes why the Posnerian intuition described above is unreliable.
Recall, Posner opines that the benefit of the English rule is increasing the "cost" of having one's
bluff called. POSNER, supra note 14, at 572. And indeed, a weak party's threat point is relatively
less attractive under an English rule. However, the logical question to ask with respect to this
purported cost is, "Compared to what?" If the alternative to bluffing is telling the truth, then
truthful revelation of her weak case would likely force the party to accept a settlement offer that
is close to her threat point as well, and as such, the "cost" of unsuccessful bluffing and the "cost"
of telling the truth are essentially a wash. However, as described in the text, the benefit of




of her case comes with an attendant cost: by signalling a strong posi-
tion on liability, she necessarily signals a weak position on indemnity
(i.e., that her opponent is likely to escape paying litigation costs). This
countervailing incentive thereby dampens the marginal benefit a pri-
vately-informed party might extract over her "threat point," which in
turn may lead her to make offers or demands that are more represen-
tative of her actual reservation value. Such increased earnestness will
often result in a narrowing of the strategic "bid-ask" spread during
negotiations, and thus a larger settlement rate.
The analysis herein is unifying because it does not depend cru-
cially on a specific bargaining procedure to govern negotiations.
Rather, I employ a methodological approach popularly called "mech-
anism design," which allows one to analyze the set of outcomes which
are consistent with noncooperative bargaining, instead of a specific
outcome of a specific procedure. Indeed, if it is possible to conclude
something about how various fee-shifting rules affect this set of out-
comes, then the effects on some particular element of this set may well
follow. Moreover, because these earlier treatments have not yielded
entirely consistent results, 18 a mechanism-design approach might sug-
gest some perspective on why and under what conditions these varia-
tions would follow.19
The analysis is also general because it takes into account not only
the most popular fee-shifting rules, but also any fee-shifting rule that
hinges on the liability outcome of trial. Thus, in addition to evaluating
18. For instance, while Lucian Bebchuk has illustrated using one type of model that a Brit-
ish style fee-shifting rule reduces the likelihood of settlement vis-A-vis an American rule, Rein-
ganum & Wilde study a different model in which the British and American rules have identical
settlement rates. See Bebchuk, Suing, supra note 6; Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 15. The
analysis below is able to reconcile these two results. See infra text accompanying notes 53-54.
Moreover, the mechanism-design approach captures within its ambit the outcomes of even
more complex procedures in which, say, a party may propose "opting" into some alternative fee-
shifting scheme, or in which the parties utilize a "settlement escrow." See infra note 58.
19. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, BARGAINING AND MARKETS 113
(1990). As the reader versed in mechanism design will recognize below, the core arguments of
this Article emerge from an analysis of the so-called "incentive compatibility" constraints alone,
even though these results carry over to analysis of an optimal mechanism, which, for expositional
purposes, I omit herein. As such, the analysis is robust to the standard criticism that it is implau-
sible to believe parties would employ an optimal bargaining mechanism in practice. See Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109
HARV. L. REV. 713, 737 (1996) (using this criticism to reject the optimal mechanism approach,
but arguably falling prey to the same critique by positing an analogously implausible bargaining
model).
To my knowledge, only one other analysis addresses fee shifting using a mechanism design
methodology, and that paper examines bargaining-based rather than liability-based fee-shifting
provisions. See Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules, 25
RAND J. ECON. 197 (1994). For a fuller explanation of the difference between this analysis and
hers, see infra note 37.
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the English, American, pro-plaintiff, and pro-defendant rules, the
framework presented below permits an analysis of a less focal rule in
which, say, the plaintiff would bear a 10% share of total costs if she
were to win, but a 78% share of total costs if the defendant were to
win. Because indemnity schemes around the world are increasingly
becoming "hybrid" in their appearance, 20 it is often insufficient to
concentrate one's attention solely on the types of fee-shifting rules
that are the most focal either domestically or historically.
Although the analysis below makes a theoretical argument for a
winner-pays rule as a settlement-facilitating device, I do not assert
that such a rule is a serious policy contender under a broader norma-
tive framework. Quite clearly, a "winner-pays" rule may be unpalat-
able and even perverse for reasons beyond facilitating settlement.21
Instead, I make a more modest argument that the winner-pays rule
animates a general refutation of the English rule as a settlement-in-
ducing device.
The Article is organized as follows. In Section I, I describe the
mechanism-design approach to modeling bilateral bargaining, and I
introduce the general framework for analysis. In Section 11,22 I use
this framework to demonstrate that for any bargaining procedure that
rational parties would employ, if either party has private information
about the probability of liability, then her incentive to misrepresent
value will be strongest under a rule where indemnity is positively re-
lated to success at trial (as is the case with the loser-pays rule). Con-
versely, her incentive to misrepresent value is weaker under a rule
where indemnity is either not related or is negatively related to suc-
cess at trial, and is in fact weakest under a winner-pays rule. In Sec-
tion III, I address various caveats and limitations of the analysis,
focussing primarily on how "settlement inducement" interacts with
cognitive, credibility, deterrence, litigation intensity, justice, and pro-
cess concerns. I conclude that on the whole, some of these concerns
argue against the myopic use of a fee-shifting rule as a settlement-
20. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
21. For instance, such a rule almost surely creates perverse incentives for plaintiffs with
completely groundless suits to sue. While this is a serious concern, there are numerous types of
injury cases (such as airline crashes) in which the set of injured plaintiffs is fairly easy to identify,
and as such groundlessness is not at issue. For a more detailed exposition on the relation be-
tween remedies and frivolous suits, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning
Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, 82 GEo. L.J. 397 (1993).
22. Readers who are not interested in following the mathematical derivations may wish to
skim the technical analysis in Section II.
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facilitating device, and as such, they probably make the adoption of a
winner-pays rule imprudent.
I. FRAMEWORK
As mentioned above, many of the extant theoretical analyses of
pre-trial settlement tend to employ rather specialized models of bar-
gaining to infer more general settlement-inducing characteristics of
legal rules. For instance, a popular approach is to assume that bar-
gaining consists of a simple two-step procedure: one party makes a
"take-it-or-leave-it" settlement offer to the other party, who can then
"accept" it or "reject" it, with either response effectively ending the
bargaining process.23 Undoubtedly, such a particularized analysis can
help to identify considerations individuals might make in formulating
their respective strategies, and it can help suggest possible ways in
which legal rules affect such strategy choices. On the other hand, it is
not clear that the majority (or even a non-trivial minority) of bargain-
ing parties utilize such simple procedures, and outcomes may be sensi-
tive to this procedural choice. 24
Despite significant advances in game-theoretic modeling, law and
economics scholars have very little intuition about the precise form
that bargaining might take. While some procedures may appear rela-
tively intuitive,25 there is in fact a large family of possible procedures
that rational parties might employ to capture gains from trade. Thus,
in order to say anything more general about bargaining, it would be
necessary either (1) to predict the expected "equilibrium" outcome
for every type of procedure rational parties might use; or (2) to de-
duce characteristics about the set of outcomes consistent with non-
cooperative bargaining without committing to a particular procedure.
Because of the infeasibility (and likely impossibility) of the first op-
tion, a number of recent approaches among bargaining theorists have
turned to a special type of game-theoretic approach commonly called
"mechanism design" ("MD") to characterize the set of outcomes that
23. E.g., Bebchuk, Litigation, supra note 15; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 19; Nalebuff,
supra note 15; Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 15.
24. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Settlement Negotiations with Two-
Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution, and Efficiency, 14 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 283 (1994) (noting this difference even when one switches the identity of the
offeror in a simple bargaining model).
25. For instance, while the settlement literature described above appears to use a take-it-or-
leave-it family of bargaining procedures, other approaches find an "alternating offers" approach
more appealing. E.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 220-24 (1994).
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noncooperative bargaining might generate. It is this latter methodol-
ogy I utilize in making the principal arguments in this Article.
26
The MD approach to bargaining commences with the observation
that all bargaining procedures-no matter how complex-lead indi-
rectly to two fundamental choices: (1) whether the parties reach
agreement; and (2) the size of any monetary transfer between the par-
ties under such an agreement.27 Within a specific bargaining proce-
dure, one can attempt to infer these two decisions by forecasting the
equilibrium behavior of the parties given their private information.
For example, consider the aforementioned "take-it-or-leave-it" bar-
gaining game between a buyer and a seller who are negotiating over
the sale of a used automobile. Under the rules of the game, the buyer
makes a single irrevocable price offer to the seller, who can either (1)
accept the offer; or (2) reject it and "walk away" from any future bar-
gaining. To capture the notion of asymmetric information, suppose
that the buyer and the seller place private valuations on the car of Vb
dollars and v, dollars, respectively. Additionally, suppose that the
parties' valuations-while privately known-are independently dis-
tributed, each falling between $0 and $1,000 with equal probability.
Under the above rules, the buyer whose private valuation is Vb will
find it optimal to make a price offer equal to half her own valuation,
or $Vb/2. The seller's optimal strategy is to accept this offer so long as
it is not below her own private valuation, v,. From these strategies, it
follows that (1) trade will occur when and only when v, <- Vb/2, and
that (2) in the event of trade, the price will be $Vb/2.
In contrast to this indirect method of deducing the circumstances
and terms of a transaction, a "direct bargaining mechanism"
prescribes these two decisions immediately. The operation of a direct
bargaining mechanism is quite simple. The negotiating parties begin
the process by independently "reporting" their valuations to a trust-
worthy and disinterested third party (often called the "mechanism de-
signer"). After receiving these reports, the third party mechanically
applies a commonly-known set of allocation rules designed to repli-
26. In previous work, I have described the MD procedure for analyzing bilateral bargaining
in greater detail. See Eric L. Talley, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liqui-
dated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1218-24 (1994).
27. One might also argue that a bargaining process determines when an agreement is
reached, and that this dimension is important if individuals discount payoffs in the future. As
will be evident below, however, this third dimension can often be captured by allowing the
agreement probability variable to represent a time discounting factor. See generally Peter C.
Cramton, Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms, in GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING
149 (Alan Roth ed., 1985) (describing the mathematical isomorphism in bargaining mechanisms
between the probability of bargaining breakdown and the delay time).
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cate the outcome of negotiations by internalizing the strategic actions
that both parties would independently make if actually bargaining
with one another. Thus, by essentially playing the bargaining game on
behalf of the parties, the rules of the mechanism will replicate the out-
come that would be produced if two parties with the valuations re-
ported were to bargain face-to-face. An important implication of the
above reasoning is that if the allocation rules are commonly known
and the mechanism designer is trustworthy, each party will find it in
her interests to report her true valuation to the mechanism designer
rather than to lie.
2 8
To see the same point more clearly, consider the above intuition
in a slightly different light: Imagine that instead of negotiating face-to-
face, the parties had to send representatives to negotiate in their
stead. Imagine further that these representatives were perfectly loyal
and intelligent, so that as long as the proxies had accurate information
of the preferences of their respective senders, they would do an
equally good job bargaining as could the senders themselves. Under
these circumstances, it would never be in the sender's strategic inter-
ests to "hide" her private valuation from her representative. Indeed,
if she sent the representative to the bargaining table with incorrect
information about her preferences, then the proxy might make unwise
proposals or imprudent judgments of competing proposals.
By an identical argument, a party would never have an incentive
to misinform a trustworthy mechanism designer of her private infor-
mation. Indeed, since the role of the bargaining representatives de-
scribed above is rather mechanical in nature (i.e., they learn their
clients' respective valuations, form strategies based on those respec-
tive valuations, and play those strategies against one another), the
representatives' roles are easily internalized and replicated by a single
third party (such as a computer) that could faithfully simulate the bar-
gaining each representative would use when informed of his respec-
tive sender's preferences. By way of illustration, recall the "take-it-or-
leave-it" example discussed above. Suppose that one were to replace
bargaining procedure with a direct revelation mechanism, in which the
buyer made a "report" b of his valuation to the mechanism designer,
and the seller simultaneously made a report s of her valuation. Sup-
pose the mechanism prescribed that trade would occur if and only if s
were no larger than b/2, and that should trade occur, the price paid to
28. This observation is commonly known as the "revelation principle." See Talley, supra
note 26, at 1220-24.
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the seller would be $b/2. Note that the trading rules and price pre-
scribed by this mechanism are exactly the same as their analogs de-
rived in the earlier take-it-or-leave-it example for Vb and v,. In other
words, the mechanism utilizes rules that reflect the exact strategies of
the parties. As such, in equilibrium neither party will have the incen-
tive to lie to the mechanism designer when reporting her valuation.2 9
The intuition above effectively restates a phenomenon known as
the revelation principle, which is at the core of MD analysis. In the
negotiation context, the revelation principle states that any outcome
of any bargaining procedure can be replicated through some direct
bargaining mechanism in which each player, regardless of her valua-
tion, would be willing to participate in lieu of litigating; and in which
each player, regardless of her valuation, maximizes her gain from bar-
gaining by reporting the truth to the mechanism designer. Thus, if one
wishes to characterize the set of outcomes consistent with every non-
cooperative bargaining procedure rational parties might use, she need
look no further than to the set of simple direct bargaining mechanisms
that induce (1) participation by both parties (i.e., satisfies "participa-
tion constraints"); and (2) truth-telling in equilibrium among the par-
ticipants (i.e., satisfies "incentive constraints"). If indemnity rules
shape or distort this set of bargaining mechanisms in a particular way,
then those legal rules would (by definition) affect the outcomes of the
various bargaining procedures comprising that set in a similar fashion.
It is to this task I now turn.
II. A FORMAL MECHANISM-DESIGN MODEL OF SUIT
AND SETTLEMENT
In this section, I lay out a formal model of litigation and settle-
ment in which each party has private information about elements of
the case, and in which the settlement analysis makes use of a mecha-
nism-design approach. The analysis consists of two parts: (1) deter-
mining the effect of the underlying fee-shifting rule on the parties'
non-bargaining (or so called "reservation") payoffs; and (2) determin-
29. I.e., b = vb and s = v, constitutes a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. For fuller explanation, see
Talley, supra note 26, at 1223-24. It should be noted that this equilibrium need not be unique,
and as such there may be other equilibria that do not involve truth-telling. This caveat is impor-
tant if one is interested in implementing a specific outcome rather than simply characterizing the
outcomes of non-cooperative play. See OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 19, at 177-96. Since




ing the possible outcomes of settlement negotiations in the shadow of
those rules.
Consider a plaintiff ("7c") and a defendant ("A") who are involved
in a legal battle in which each possesses proprietary information about
the outcome of the case. The plaintiff knows her damages, d, while
the defendant knows the probability that he will be found negligent, x.
These private valuations are independent of one another; as such, the
plaintiff's knowledge of the exact value of d gives her no added infor-
mation about the exact value of x, and vice-versa for the defendant.
While these exact values of d and x are privately known by the respec-
tive parties, it is commonly known that d lies somewhere between a
low value of d and a high value of d with equal probability, and simi-
larly that x lies between x and k with equal probability (so-called "uni-
form" distributions). 30
Absent bargaining, the parties will litigate their dispute in court.
Should they end up in litigation, the court will award the plaintiff an
amount d with probability x. Litigation, however, is costly. To con-
centrate on the bargaining issues, I assume that the joint cost of litigat-
ing is fixed (or "exogenous") at level C, notwithstanding the parties'
privately-known information. Assume that initially (i.e., before apply-
ing the indemnity rule), the parties' privately-borne shares of aggre-
gate litigation costs are 0 for the defendant, and (1-0) for the plaintiff,
where 0 represents some value between 0 and 1.31
A "liability-contingent fee-shifting scheme" effectively reallo-
cates the costs between the parties from the privately-borne shares of
0 and (1-0), depending on who prevails in the liability phase of trial.
Thus, if the court finds for the plaintiff (i.e., liability), the fee-shifting
rule specifies one cost allocation sharing rule, in which the defendant
must bear some fractional share a of total costs, and the plaintiff bears
the remaining (1-a) share, where ( is between 0 and 1. Conversely, if
the court finds for the defendant (i.e., no liability), the rule specifies
another (possibly different) sharing rule, in which the defendant bears
a fractional share 13 of total costs while the plaintiff bears the residual
30. The assumptions made above are a special case of what is shown in the Appendix. A
more formal treatment would require only independently distributed valuations with so-called
"monotone hazard rates." See Appendix, infra Moreover, the qualitative conclusions of this
model survive when the plaintiff (rather than the defendant) possesses private information about
liability, or when both litigants receive independent private signals about liability. See infra
notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
31. This notation is simply for explanatory ease, and is not critical. For instance, an alterna-
tive exposition is to assume exogenous litigation costs of C. and C,, respectively, for the parties.
One can map this approach into the above framework by setting C = C+CA and 0 = CA/[C+C].
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(1-3) share of costs, where 13 is between 0 and 1. The table below
concisely summarizes this "family" of liability-contingent fee-shifting
schemes.32
Liability Result Costs bome byA Costs bore by n
AZnt lableIF PC FZIKIJC
TABLE 1
FAMILY OF LIABILITY-CONTINGENT FEE-SHIFTING RULES
The above scheme describes not only common liability-depen-
dent fee-shifting schemes (the American rule, British rule, pro-plain-
tiff, etc.), but also any other type of liability-based indemnity rule. For
instance, a rule mandating that the defendant bear 90% of costs when
liable, but only 12% of costs if not liable corresponds to setting a =
0.90 and 13 = 0.12. Figure 1 further illustrates the generality of a fee-
shifting scheme summarized by a and 13. In the figure, points A, B, C,
D, and E represent various fee-shifting schemes of interest. At point
A (where ax = 3 = 0), the American "both-pay" rule is in effect, in
which each party bears her private costs regardless of who prevails. 33
Point B (where a = 1 and 13 = 0) denotes the British or loser-pays
regime, in which the losing party must pay both sides' legal fees. Two
other familiar "one-sided" fee-shifting formulae include: (1) point C
(where a = 1 and 13 = 0) known as the "pro-plaintiff' rule, where each
bears its own private cost if the defendant prevails, and the defendant
bears both parties' costs if the plaintiff wins; and (2) point D (where ac
= 0 and 13 = 0) known as the "pro-defendant" rule, so called for analo-
gous reasons. Finally, the reader should at this juncture take note of
point E (where a = 0 and 13 = 1), which corresponds with the seem-
32. Nothing in theory constrains a and 0 to lie between 0 and 1. It is possible to conceive of
a legal rule that say, sets a = 2, and thereby requires a losing defendant to provide double
indemnity to a prevailing plaintiff. Nonetheless, I constrain my analysis to the articulated
boundaries noted above in order to concentrate on the question of fee-shifting rules rather than
optimal damages awards (although admittedly these questions are related).
33. Note that point A could lie anywhere on the 45-degree line in the unit square, depend-
ing on the value of 0, the defendant's privately-borne share of C.
[Vol. 71:461
LIABILITY-BASED FEE-SHIFTING RULES
ingly perverse winner-pays rule, dictating that the party who prevails
on liability must pay both sides' fees.
E
//






VARIOUs FEE-SHIFrING RULES IN a-3 SPACE.
({a, 0} = A's cost share with and without liability)
As mentioned above, indemnity rules can affect both the selec-
tion of suits and the bargaining behavior associated with credible suits.
In order to concentrate on the latter, I henceforth assume that litiga-
tion costs are sufficiently small relative to other parameters that the
plaintiff always poses a credible threat to sue.34
From the litigation fee structure described above, it is possible to
specify the reservation payoffs for each party, i.e, the payoff that each
party could expect in the absence of bargaining. Knowing these
payoffs is of course vital, since each party's incentive to bluff centers
on how much she stands to gain over and above her reservation point
(often called her BATNA 35). Thus, considering the plaintiff first, suit
will award her a privately-known judgment of d dollars, albeit with
some unknown probability x, which, though known with certainty only
to the defendant, has an expected value of k = (x+!c)/2. Additionally,
34. A sufficient condition for this assumption to hold is C _< x • d. In Section IV of this
Article, I briefly address the effects of relaxing this assumption, which formally has an ambigu-
ous effect on the analysis.
35. BATNA is an acronym for "Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement."
1995]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the plaintiff perceives that she will have to bear (1-a)C dollars in liti-
gation costs if liability is found, again with expected probability of k.
With the complementary probability of (1-1i), the plaintiff will have to
bear (1-P)C dollars in litigation costs. Putting all these factors to-
gether, the plaintiff's reservation payoff under the fee-shifting scheme
{c,13} is:
n's Reservation Payoff= Y.[d+(a-13) C] -(1-13) C. (1)
In contrast, the defendant knows the precise probability x that he
will be found liable. If so found, he will have to make an unknown
damages payment of d, which, while known only to the plaintiff, has
an expected value of d = (d+d)/2. Additionally, with probability x the
defendant will bear aC dollars in litigation costs, and with the comple-
mentary probability (1-x) the defendant will bear 13C dollars in litiga-
tion costs. Putting these factors together, the defendant's reservation
payoff under the fee-shifting mechanism {a,13} is:
A's Reservation Payoff = -x. [d+ (a-13) C] - 13C. (2)
Expressions (1) and (2) represent the baseline payoff that each
party could expect if no bargaining were allowed. Note that if the
payoff that either party expects from bargaining is lower than her
BATNA, one or both of them will refuse to participate. As such, a
direct bargaining mechanism must be able to provide each party with
a payoff that exceeds those described in the above expressions. 36
Moreover, note that altering the underlying fee-shifting rule (i.e.,
changing the values of a and 13) has a direct effect on the respective
reservation payoffs of both parties. It is through this effect on the
BATNAs that the underlying indemnity rule can alter the ultimate
terms and success rate of any private settlement.
Given the above reservation payoffs, one may proceed to analyze
the characteristics of a bargaining mechanism itself. Recall from the
previous section that any bargaining procedure, no matter how com-
plex, ultimately makes two fundamental decisions. First, whether bar-
gaining culminates in an agreement; and second, what transfer
payment is necessary between the defendant and plaintiff pursuant to
such an agreement. Moreover, the revelation principle tells us that it
is possible to describe the set of outcomes consistent with bilateral
bargaining by limiting our attention to direct revelation mechanisms
that reach these two decisions directly, with the rules calibrated so




that each party finds it optimal both to participate and to report the
truth to the mechanism designer.
"Settlement" A pays 7t settlement
Plaintiff (it) Reports 8 P (S,')7-,1 amount of s(6,y).
Mechanism
Designer
Defendent(A) Reports . "Litigation" ' A pays $d to 7t
[l-p( 8,y)] with probability x.
FIGURE 2
ILLUSTRATIVE REPRESENTATION OF A SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
Thus, consider a direct mechanism for settlement, which is illus-
trated in Figure 2. In the first stage of the mechanism, the parties
simultaneously and independently report their private information to
the mechanism designer. Because the task here is to design a mecha-
nism in which the parties-though not required to-find it in their
best interests to report truthfully, one must allow at least for the possi-
bility that one's report is not in accord with her actual knowledge.
Thus, denote the plaintiff's report of her damages as $, and the defend-
ant's report of his probability of liability as 'y. In the second stage of
the mechanism, the mechanism designer uses the reports to make the
two decisions described above: (1) the probability p(6,y) that the par-
ties. settle; and (2) a transfer payment s(6 ,y) from the defendant to the
plaintiff should settlement occur. Under this mechanism, then, a set-
tlement will not occur with probability [1-p(,y)]. In such a contin-
gency, the parties will end up in court, and (as before) the court will
render a judgment of d dollars for the plaintiff with probability x. 37
37. Unlike the "no bargaining" case, however, the parties will appropriately "update" their
assessment of the strength of their opponent's case should bargaining fail. This is shown in the
Appendix, infra It is, of course, important to allow for such "Bayesian" updating after bargain-
ing breakdown, since the breakdown process itself can be extremely important to the parties.
Those familiar with the bargaining literature will recognize that this analysis is most closely
allied with the notable work of Spier, supra note 19. The present analysis differs, however, in
one major respect. Spier's paper is an analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, and thus
views fee-shifting rules exclusively as instruments of the bargaining mechanism. In Spier's
model, refusal to participate in the bargaining mechanism results in litigation under the tradi-
tional American rule, in which each side bears her own legal costs. While the correct modeling
choice for a Rule 68 paper, such an approach is inappropriate for an analysis of default legal
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Because bargaining represents a way in which parties can turn
potential pareto improvements into actual pareto improvements
through agreement and monetary transfers, the relevant payoff mea-
sure for each party is her net, rather than gross, payoff (i.e., the ex-
pected gain that she can expect from bargaining rather than
immediately litigating). Using the above definitions, it is possible to
express the expected net gain that a bargaining mechanism confers on
each party over her reservation utility, which is simply the difference
between each party's payoff under the mechanism and her reservation
utility: 38
iT's Net Gain = Ex{p(8,x) .s(8,x)-p(8,x)[x(d+(-fP) C)- (1-p3) C]} (3)
A's Net Gain = Ed{-p(d,y) .s(d,y) +p(d,y). [x(d+(ci-[) C) + 3 C] } (4)
Finally, note that the aggregate social level of wealth created by a
settlement procedure is simply the expected sum of each player's indi-
vidual net payoff. As one might guess intuitively, this sum is simply
the expected savings of litigation costs, C, weighted by the expected
probability that settlement occurs:
Aggregate Surplus = Ed, {p(dx). C} (5)
Thus, the principal attribute of concern for a settlement mechanism in
this model is its ability to circumvent litigation, thereby saving the liti-
gants (and society) the aggregate private costs of litigation, or OC+(1-
O)C = C. More interestingly, note that because C > 0, it is common
knowledge 39 that there are gains from settlement, and thus-if the
mechanism designer did not have to worry about participation and
incentive constraints-a "perfect" settlement procedure could avoid
these costs if it set p(dx) = 1 for all plaintiffs and defendants, regard-
less of their respective reports.40
rules. In contrast, my approach studies indemnity rules as legal defaults that govern fee alloca-
tion regardless of whether the parties participate in settlement negotiations. The object of the
analysis is to design these legal defaults in a manner that facilitates bargaining between the
parties. At the end of her article, Spier does conjecture that within this family of default rules, a
"reverse English rule" facilitates settlement. Id. at 210. However, because the outside option in
her model always amounts to litigation under the American rule, her model does not formally
address fee-shifting schemes as default rules.
38. For those wishing to replicate these expressions, the derivation of the two equations
below appears in the Appendix. Note that these conditions implicitly assume that the other
party reports truthful information-a condition that is confirmed in equilibrium.
39. The term "common knowledge" refers to a fact that everybody knows about, everybody
knows that everybody knows about, everybody knows that everybody knows that everybody
knows about, ad infinitum. See John Geanakoplos, Common Knowledge, 6 J. ECON. PERSPEC-
iVES, Fall 1992, at 53, 54 (1992).
40. In an extremely narrow sense, a "perfect-settlement" rule (where p(dx) = 1) might
correspond to an "efficient" rule. In this Article, however, I avoid using this characterization in
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Nevertheless, as mentioned above, in order to induce participa-
tion and truthful reporting by the privately-informed bargainers, a
mechanism utilizing a given settlement rule must pay participants "in-
formation rents" above their BATNAs for revealing their private
knowledge. Because settlement is not an activity subsidized by a third
party, each party's information rents must come from her opponent in
the form of bargaining concessions, thereby reducing the magnitude
of rents one can promise her. Finally, as noted above, the aggregate
size of these rents are directly related to the strategic incentives of the
parties to misrepresent their valuations during bargaining. Thus,
should the sum of expected rents required by the players grow too
large, it would swamp the effective size of the bargaining "pie" avail-
able. In such a situation, a perfect settlement rule is said to be infeasi-
ble. Such feasibility concerns will frequently limit the mechanism
designer to using an imperfect settlement mechanism, in which p(dx)
is not uniformly equal to 1.
4 1
With the above specification of the parties' respective net payoffs
from bargaining, it is possible to describe the constraints that "truth-
telling" must impose on the possible mechanisms for trade. Recall
that a mechanism-design approach is one that induces such truthful
revelation by promising the parties an explicit payoff equal to the
amount by which they would profit from lying in the equivalent bar-
gaining procedure.
Consider first the plaintiff, whose privately-known information in
this model is the extent of her damages, d. As one would surmise
intuitively, the plaintiff's usual strategic incentive is to overstate (if
possible) the extent of her damages when bargaining, so as to extract
attractive settlement terms from the defendant. This incentive is of
course the strongest for plaintiffs whose damages level is quite low
(i.e., near the lower bound d of plaintiff damages). On the other hand,
light of the fact that "efficient settlement" is but one component within efficiency calculus. In
fact, as some have previously noted, there may often be reasons to believe that perfect settle-
ment may be uniquely undesirable if it deprives society of legal precedent which has value as a
public good in contributing to the predictability and certainty of law. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Keith N. Hylton, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 427 (1995).
Compare Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facili-
tate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1072-78 (1995) (arguing that "vagueness" in the under-
lying legal rule can have a beneficial effect of inducing parties to reveal private information
voluntarily).
41. This contrasts to the more conventional insight due to Myerson & Satterthwaite, that
common knowledge of gains from trade should lead to trade with probability 1. See R. Myerson
& M. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (1983).
The observation that the conventional wisdom may not hold in pre-trial bargaining is also made
in Spier, supra note 19.
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plaintiffs with high damages (i.e., near the upper bound 3) generally
will not stand to profit substantially from misrepresenting their valua-
tions, since there is little "room" for them to shade in a credible way.
4 2
Consequently, the "information rent" that must be paid to induce
truth-telling in a bargaining mechanism must be larger for low-dam-
ages plaintiffs, whose marginal incentives to bluff are the largest. The
following expression (derived formally in the Appendix) explicitly il-
lustrates this intuition, describing the slope of the information rent
that the plaintiff must receive to induce truthful revelation:
[Slope of 7t's rent schedule] = -Ex{x.p(dx)} (6)
There are a few important features of the above expression that
deserve special attention here. First, notice that the slope of the plain-
tiff's rent schedule can never be positive, and in general will be nega-
tive in her private valuation. This feature is captured in Figure 3.
Note from the figure that the lower the plaintiff's damages level, the
higher the net payoff she must be promised in exchange for truthful
reporting of her private valuation. Because bargaining is generally
not subsidized by a third party, this payoff (i.e., the vertical height of
the grey area in Figure 3) must come from the defendant in terms of
bargaining concessions. Consequently, the above condition will be in-
creasingly restrictive as it grows increasingly steep. Moreover, notice
that under a "universal-settlement" bargaining mechanism-i.e.,
where p(dx) = 1 for every value of d and x-the plaintiff's rent sched-
ule is the steepest, and as such the concessions demanded by the plain-
tiff are the largest. These are concessions that the defendant may not
be able to make in the extreme, and thus in many instances such a
universal rule will be infeasible. In contrast, a "no-settlement" rule-
i.e., where p(dx) = 0 for every value of d and x-will by definition
minimize (at zero) the slope of the rent schedule, and in so doing
eliminate the required concessions from the defendant. While such a
settlement mechanism is feasible, 43 there are likely to be many other
settlement procedures that would be more attractive, at least on litiga-
tion-cost-saving grounds. Finally, it is important to notice that ax and
42. For instance, if it were commonly known that the plaintiff's level of damages were be-
tween $500,000 and $1,000,000, a plaintiff with privately-known damages of, say, $999,999 would
not credibly be able to claim damages of $20,000,000, or even $1,000,001. Thus, such a plaintiff
type would have very little "room" to bluff.
43. For instance, the "no-settlement" mechanism corresponds to the trivial bargaining game
in which neither party is allowed to make or accept any offers. Clearly, both parties would be
(weakly) willing to play this game instead of litigating straight away, since this game gives them
identical payoffs to that of litigating directly.
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03, the fee-shifting parameters, do not affect the slope of the plaintiff's
information rent schedule. Thus, the underlying (liability-based) fee-
shifting rule apparently does not affect the information rent of a
player with private knowledge of damages (as opposed to the likeli-
hood of liability)."
Low-damages 7t expects
S largest bargaining gains
It's
Information High-damages it expects






REPRESENTATION OF nt'S INFORMATION RENT
Now consider the defendant, who privately knows x, the likeli-
hood of liability. Like the plaintiff, the defendant will frequently mis-
represent the strength of his case, attempting to understate (if
possible) the extent of his liability so as to extract greater concessions
from the plaintiff in bargaining. "Weak" defendants (i.e., those whose
privately-known liability level is high-near the upper bound x) are
likely to have relatively large incentives and abilities to engage in such
misrepresentation. In contrast, "strong" defendants (i.e., those whose
liability is near the lower bound) generally cannot profit from misrep-
resenting their valuations, since there is little room for them to shade
credibly.
44. Remember that "information rent" refers only to the portion of the relevant party's
expected settlement payment in excess of what she would receive in litigation. Thus, a fee-shift-
ing rule setting a = 1 and 3 = 1 would clearly benefit the plaintiff in litigation, and would thereby
increase the aggregate payment she would require in settlement; however, such a rule does not
affect the amount of rent in excess of that payment that low-damages plaintiffs would require to
satisfy truth-telling, or so-called "incentive compatibility" conditions.
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As in the case of the plaintiff, it is possible to derive a formal
expression that, consistent with the above intuition, describes the
slope of the defendant's information rent function:
[Slope of A's rent schedule]=Ed{d.p(dx)+(a-3).C.p(dx) } (7)
To some extent, the defendant's rent schedule is simply the comple-
ment of the plaintiff's. Indeed, the above expression-conceptually
illustrated in Figure 4-implies that the slope of the defendant's
schedule can never be negative, and will generally be positive.45 The
Low-liability A expects
smallest bargaining gains
A's \ High-liability A expects
Information largest bargaining gains
Rent





REPRESENTATION OF A'S INFORMATION RENT
high-liability defendants have the most to gain from bargaining rather
than litigating, while the low-liability defendants, who are less able to
exploit the potential gains from misrepresentation, receive little or no
rents. Just as before, the steeper the defendant's rent schedule for
some settlement rule p(dx), the harder it is to find a settlement
amount s(dx) to make that settlement rule feasible in practice. Con-
sequently, ceteris paribus, the bargaining procedure that is the most
challenging to implement is the so-called "universal settlement" rule
(i.e., where p(dx) = 1 for all d and x), which maximizes the slope.
45. The monotonicity of the slope is due to the assumption above that all suits are credible.
Note from equation (7), if the settlement rule p(dx) is monotone nondecreasing in d, then the
first term in the expression will swamp the second if the expected value of d exceeds C (which is
implied by the earlier assumption of suit credibility). The monotonicity of p(dx) is in fact en-
sured by incentive compatibility constraints. Relaxing this assumption does not necessarily af-
fect the qualitative result, however. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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Conversely, ceteris paribus, the "no-settlement" rule (i.e., where
p(d,x) = 0 for all values of d and x) is perfectly feasible, but it is likely
to be less attractive than some other feasible procedure.
Unlike the plaintiff's case, however, the expression above reveals
that in addition to depending on the settlement rule p(dx), the slope
of the defendant's schedule is also related to the fee-shifting parame-
ters {f3}. More explicitly, the slope contains a component that is
increasing linearly in (a-p), the difference between the defendant's
"liability share" and "no-liability share" of aggregate litigation costs.
Thus, the larger the value of (a-3), the greater the payments that are
required (all else held constant) to induce truth-telling among defend-
ants. Once again, because these payments must come from plaintiff
concessions, a steeper rent function for the defendant places increas-
ingly larger restrictions on the types of settlement rules available.
Rent schedule for new value
I of(t 1-P31)>(a 0 -3 0)
A's Info. Rent \ \-Rent schedule for initial







A's INFORMATION RENT SCHEDULE CHANGES WITH THE
FEE-SHIFTING RULE
Figure 5 represents how a change in the underlying fee-shifting
regime can affect the information rent schedule of the defendant. In
the figure, an initial fee-shifting rule of {of30} gives way to a new




4 6 Notice that because of this larger difference, the defend-
ant's information rent schedule is higher under the new regime than it
was originally, most strikingly so for weak defendants, for whom the
incentive to misrepresent their types is clearly the strongest. More-
over, recall from the earlier analysis that since the plaintiff's rent
schedule is independent of the fee-shifting rule, her information rent
schedule is the same in both cases.47 As such, the change in the in-
demnity rule from {coc3o} to {a1,3 1} imposes large barriers to the fea-
sibility of a given settlement rule p(dx), since the parties will, on
average, demand more extreme concessions from one another during
bargaining.4 8 Conversely, if the change in regime were to give rise to
a smaller value of (a-P3), then that change would have the effect of
loosening the feasibility constraints on a given settlement rule p(dx).
The above reasoning immediately gives rise to a formalization of
the central argument of this Article: i.e., the more that a fee-shifting
rule complements the parties' other strategic incentives during negoti-
ation, the less likely it is that a settlement-inducing bargaining proce-
dure is available to them. In terms of the parameters a and 3, recall
that a loser-pays fee-shifting rule is one that sets a = 1 and 03 = 0,
which thus implies that (a-P3) = 1. Note that this rule corresponds to
the maximal value of (a-13) relative to any other liability-contingent
fee-shifting rule.49 In contrast, under the American rule, in which
each party pays her own private share of litigation costs, both a and 13
are equal to 0 (the defendant's privately-borne share of total costs C),
and thus (a-13) = 0. The two "one-way" fee-shifting rules give rise to
intermediate levels of (a-3), with the pro-plaintiff rule setting (a-3) =
(1-0), and the pro-defendant rule setting (a-13) = 0.
Thus, in comparing the "usual suspects" for fee-shifting regimes,
the analysis above reveals that a loser-pays rule gives rise to the most
severe strategic demands among the parties during negotiation. As
such, the English rule may not be able to support bargaining outcomes
with relatively high success rates (i.e., rules where p(d,x) is close to 1),
although such outcomes may be feasible under some alternative fee-
shifting regime. Additionally, both of the one-way fee-shifting rules
46. In geometric terms, [a,,P3,] must lie to the southeast of the 45-degree line that passes
through [a0 30]. See infra Figure 6.
47. Though, of course, a change in the fee-shifting rule would affect both parties' reserva-
tion payoffs.
48. Explicitly, the defendant's demanded concessions are greater, and the plaintiffs remain
unchanged.
49. Recall, this is under the assumption that 0 < a _< 1 and 0! < !5 1 - i.e., that the underly-
ing regime can do no more than to shift fees, and it cannot otherwise affect the award.
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are slightly less restrictive than the English rule. The pairwise com-
parison of the one-way rules is ambiguous, however, depending on the
relative magnitude of 0 (with values of 0 > 1/2 favoring the pro-plain-
tiff rule, and vice-versa for values of 0 < 1/2). Finally, the American
"both-pay" regime imposes even smaller feasibility constraints. Thus,
in addition to being able to support any outcome that the other focal
regimes can support, the American rule may also support high settle-
ment rate outcomes that are not feasible under the others. Moreover,
note that since under the American rule the value of (a-3) = 0 regard-
less of the value of 0, the privately-borne shares of litigation costs do
not affect the barriers to settlement under the American rule.50
While it is tempting to end things here, it is perhaps instructive to
push the analysis beyond the aforementioned "usual suspects" of fee-
shifting regimes, and consider other, less focal, types of liability-con-
tingent fee-shifting regimes. Because the arguments above suggest
that an analysis of the settlement-facilitating characteristics of a fee-
shifting regime {f3} boils down to the value of (a-P), incorporating
other potential rules into the above analysis is not overly difficult. For
instance, for a given fee-shifting rule {ao130} in which (ao-13o) is equal
to some constant K, it may be possible to find other fee-shifting rules
for which (a-13) = K as well. Thus, as mentioned above, because a = 0
= 0 under an American regime, (a-13) = 0 notwithstanding the value of
0. Additionally, it is easy to find alternative rules that replicate the
settlement-inducing characteristics of the one-way fee-shifting awards,
yet with different distributional characteristics. 51 The English rule, in
contrast, is somewhat unique in that one cannot find an alternative
fee-shifting rule that so restricts feasibility of a given outcome. Thus,
not only is the British rule inept at inducing high settlement rates in
this model, but it is uniquely inept in this regard.
Furthermore, it may be possible to find fee-shifting regimes that
impose even smaller barriers to settlement than do the ones described
above. Note that one feature shared by the above rules is that in each
case, the value of (a-3) is greater than or equal to 0. In principle,
50. This analysis formalizes the assertion in Keith Hylton's article that a pro-plaintiff rule is
likely to be somewhere between a British and American rule in its ability to facilitate settlement.
See Hylton, supra note 40, at 445.
51. Consider, for example, a pro-defendant rule in which a = 0 and 0 = 0. Assume (arbi-
trarily) that 0 = 0.6, and thus (a-P) = 0.6. This indemnity rule would have equivalent settlement-
facilitating attributes as an alternative scheme in which a = I and 0 = 0.4, even though this latter
rule would impose a heavier cost burden (i.e., 0.4xC) on the defendant whether he wins or loses.




there is nothing to prevent one from analyzing indemnity schemes in-
volving negative values of (a-3). One such scheme is the so-called
winner-pays rule, in which a = 0 and 03 = 1. Such a rule implies that
(a-p3) = -1, which is the smallest possible value that (a-3) can take.
As such, a winner-pays rule introduces a strong, negative component
in the slope of the defendant's rent function from equation (7) above.
So long as this negative component does not swamp the positive com-
ponent (which is implied by the earlier assumption that all suits are
credible), then the winner-pays rule ensures that the defendant's rent
schedule is as flat as possible for any given settlement rule p(dx).










FEASIBILITY OF p(dx) = 1 SETTLEMENT RULE IN a-3 SPACE.
As such, the winner-pays rule minimizes the magnitude of plain-
tiff concessions that the defendant will demand, thereby imposing the
least restrictive constraints to successful bargaining. Figure 6 illus-
trates this argument graphically. The figure shows the set of fee-shift-
ing regimes {a,3} that are capable of supporting bargaining
procedures with perfect settlement (i.e., a settlement rule where
p(d,x) = 1 for all values of d and x), under the assumptions that d is
distributed uniformly between $100 and $130, x is distributed uni-
formly between 0.5 and 1.0, and aggregate litigation costs are $72.52
In this case, it turns out that perfect settlement is feasible if and only if
52. Note that litigation is always credible absent bargaining, since the plaintiff's expected
recovery exceeds $75 > $72 = C regardless of her type, and regardless of the fee-shifting rule.
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(at-0) <_ 0.45. Thus, of points A, B, C, D, and E shown in Figure 6,
only point E-the winner-pays rule--can support perfect settlement.
The ability of the underlying fee-shifting rule to produce both
positive and negative components in the slope of the defendant's rent
schedule is the mathematical analog of the intuition given at the be-
ginning of this Article. Under a winner-pays rule, the defendant's or-
dinary incentive to misrepresent downward his privately-known level
of liability is mitigated by the fact that such a signal, if successful, si-
multaneously suggests to the plaintiff that she is not likely to have to
bear a large share of the aggregate litigation costs. Because the de-
fendant faces these countervailing strategic concerns, his marginal in-
centive to bluff decreases, and so also do the information rents he
would require to induce truth-telling under a bargaining mechanism.
With this observation, it is now possible to state formally the con-
clusion of this Article in terms of the settlement-facilitating effects of
various fee-shifting regimes:
If a settlement rule p(dx) is feasible for some fee-shifting regime
{a*3*}, then that same settlement rule must also be feasible for any
alternative regime {at',P'} in which (a'-D') < (o*-*). Consequently,
if there exists any fee-shifting regime for which a settlement rule
p(d,x) is feasible, then that settlement rule must be feasible under the
winner-pays regime as well. Furthermore, if a settlement rule p(dx)
is feasible under the loser-pays regime, then that settlement rule must
be feasible under any other alternative { , 3 } regime.
The above proposition partially summarizes the mechanism-design
analysis utilized in this Article. It essentially states that the set of fea-
sible bargaining outcomes will never shrink, and will frequently grow
as the underlying indemnity scheme moves away from the British re-
gime, and in the direction of a winner-pays regime. Moreover, the
new possibilities that arise with such a change in regime are ones in
which settlement rate p(dx) is closer to the perfect settlement rate of
1. The resulting implication is that bargaining parties have more effi-
cient bargaining procedures at their disposal under one-way rules than
under the English rule, more still under the American rule, and even
more still under the winner-pays rule.
III. CAVEATS, EXTENSIONS, AND LIMITATIONS
As with many theoretical models, the above analysis demon-
strates the essential argument of this Article in the starkest of terms;
but it does so at the cost of simplification. It is therefore important to
put these findings in proper context, in asking how either the interpre-
tation, relaxation, or variation of the underlying assumptions affect
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the model's conclusions. Below I briefly examine five such caveats:
(A) the content of the underlying informational environment; (B) the
difference between possibilities and predictions in analyzing bargain-
ing; (C) cognitive barriers to settlement; (D) the effect of risk aver-
sion; and (E) the interaction of the above arguments with other
normative concerns beyond settlement-facilitation.
A. Robustness to the Informational Environment
One question one might have about the model above is how sen-
sitive the results are to alterations in the informational environment
that the parties face. In the above analysis, I assumed that the plain-
tiff had private information about damages, and the defendant had
private information about liability. While such an approach may seem
intuitive, it is far from the only modeling choice possible. Other anal-
yses of pretrial bargaining (which used an explicit game-theoretic
framework rather than a MD approach) tend to focus on different
types of informational frameworks. The results of these various ap-
proaches are not altogether in agreement.5 3
As it turns out, the strategic effects of the underlying fee-shifting
rule rely on one critical assumption: At least one of the parties has
some information about liability that is proprietary. Thus, the results
of the above model would not change significantly if it were the plain-
tiff who knew the probability of the defendant's liability. In such a
case, however, the countervailing incentive effect of the fee-shifting
rule would act on the plaintiff rather than the defendant, but nonethe-
less, the general conclusion still holds that procedures giving higher
settlement rates are more likely the smaller the value of (a-3). Alter-
natively, one might assume that each party privately receives a signal
about the likelihood of liability. So long as these signals are not per-
fectly correlated with one another,5 4 the above arguments still hold.55
53. For instance, Bebchuk considers a model where a victim with commonly-known dam-
ages makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a defendant whose level of negligence is privately-
known. Bebchuk, Litigation, supra note 15. Instead of completely parameterizing the fee-shift-
ing regimes as done above, he limits his analysis to the choice of American, British, pro-plaintiff,
and pro-defendant rules. Nevertheless, of these four rules, he finds an ordinal ranking that is
consistent with my results. On the other hand, Reinganum & Wilde consider the obverse of this
model, in which a defendant with a publicly-known negligence level makes a single offer to a
plaintiff with privately-known damages. Reinganum & Wilde, supra note 15. They find no dif-
ference between the various fee-shifting rules considered above in facilitating settlement.
54. If the signals were perfectly correlated, then the likelihood of liability would be com-
mon knowledge.
55. Finally, note that the reasoning above helps explain why Reinganum & Wilde, supra
note 15, do not find any difference in the settlement inducing attributes of various fee-shifting
rules. In their model, the probability of liability is commonly known, and the only private infor-
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While there may well be bargaining environments in which the
probability of liability is commonly-known, the possibility that one or
more parties retains proprietary ownership of such information (even
after a lengthy discovery process) does not seem excessively far-
fetched.
B. Bargaining Possibilities vs. Actual Behavior
The principal arguments above are confined to bargaining pos-
sibilities rather than predictions about how parties will actually bar-
gain. In other words, the MD analysis illustrates that the closer one
moves in the direction of winner-pays rules, the more likely it is that
the parties will have bargaining procedures available to them which
induce high average settlement rates. Whether the parties actually
utilize any of these procedures, however, is another matter. As noted
in the introduction, the choice of procedure is one that is still some-
what elusive within game-theoretic analysis.
56
One's initial reaction to this dilemma might be to argue that if the
parties could commit contractually to an arbitration procedure before
learning their respective private valuations, then they would stipulate
one that gives rise to a high settlement rate, since such a procedure
would allow them to capture maximally the foregone costs of litiga-
tion. While intriguing, such a possibility is often not possible, espe-
cially in contexts where it is prohibitively expensive (if not impossible)
for the parties to bargain with one another before both the defend-
ant's possibly negligent act and the plaintiff's injury occurs. More-
over, if such ex ante contracting were possible, we would expect
parties to contract into an optimal fee-shifting regime regardless of
mation concerns damages. If no party has private information about liability, then neither party
must worry about sending simultaneous signals about case strength and expected litigation costs.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
One way to address this indeterminacy is to assume that the parties will utilize the most
efficient bargaining procedure possible (often called an "optimal mechanism"). It is straightfor-
ward to show that the same principal conclusions of the above analysis-because they relax the
constraints on the entire set of bargaining outcomes-must also apply to the optimal bargaining
mechanism. Nonetheless, the assumption that the parties will always use such a procedure is
arguably artificial.
It might be argued that the inability of the MD approach to make positive predictions about
the procedural choice of the parties renders such an approach unhelpful. The implied conse-
quence of this critique is that the alternative modeling choice of an explicit, extensive-form bar-
gaining procedure to analyze legal rules is more suggestive of what might actually happen during
bargaining. As articulated above, however, such a conclusion is naive, in that it neglects the fact
that the very assumption that the parties will always utilize a fixed procedure carries with it an
analogous dimension of artificiality. Moreover, while the MD approach can at least describe the
set of outcomes that are possible with all procedures, a fixed-procedure approach is incapable of
doing even that. See supra note 19.
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the default rule, therefore rendering the choice of default fee-shifting
rule somewhat irrelevant in efficiency terms.
57
More realistically, there may be some reason to believe that even
if the parties could not contract ex ante, they might tend nonetheless
to adopt a bargaining procedure that leads to high settlement rates
whenever possible. Given the recent emphasis-both in practice and
theory-on the role of mediators, settlement escrows, and other ADR
mechanisms in legal bargaining, increasingly one might expect parties
to coordinate (through such a device) on a procedure that minimizes
wasted surplus.58 While some have criticized this "mediator" interpre-
tation of bargaining mechanism-design problems59 (especially because
it neglects the possibility that the parties could do even better by con-
tracting for the mediator before learning their private valuation), in
57. See Donohue, supra note 7. This is of course a simple application of the Coase theorem,
since, in the ex ante world, informational costs are not yet present. As Ayres and Gertner have
previously pointed out, however, the underlying default rule can play significant roles in contrac-
tual gap-filling, in either a majoritarian or a punitive fashion. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989).
58. John Donohue has argued (in the Coasean tradition) that the parties might contract into
an optimal fee-shifting rule at the interim stage right before trial. Donohue, supra note 7, at
1099. The present analysis need not consider such an extension explicitly, however, because it
already does so implicitly. Indeed, the MD approach (via the revelation principle) can account
for the outcome of multi-stage bargaining procedures within a single static bargaining mecha-
nism. As such, the asymmetric information about liability in this model can be seen as a type of
"transaction cost" that prevents the Coase theorem from operating frictionlessly. See Ayres &
Talley, supra note 40, at 1035-36.
In a slightly different fashion, Gertner & Miller have recently argued the case for a "settle-
ment escrow," in which each party submits a settlement offer/demand to an escrow agent, who
then either (i) decides on an ultimate settlement amount (if the offer and demand "overlap"); or
(ii) remains silent (in the case of no overlap). Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settle-
ment Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 87 (1995). As readers versed in mechanism design will imme-
diately see, Gertner and Miller's escrow is really a type of indirect revelation mechanism.
Moreover, the revelation principle enables one to map their mechanism into a direct revelation
mechanism where truth-telling is optimal. See DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THE-
ORY 243-46 (1991). Thus, the optimal bargaining mechanism will in a practical sense look quite a
bit like a settlement escrow; that is, both parties will make "reports" to a third agent, who then
either decides on a settlement amount or sends them away. In this sense, the approach of my
analysis nests their result.
Gertner and Miller assert that their proposed escrow mechanism is in fact superior to a
generalized mechanism-design approach, because they can lay their scheme on top of an existing
bargaining game (simultaneous offers), and they still find that the players will find it individually
rational to utilize the escrow mechanism. While this statement is partially correct, a mechanism-
design approach is also capable of doing the same thing, by simply respecifying the litigants'
participation constraints to ensure each party receives a reservation utility equal to her expected
payoff in some extensive form bargaining game. I have not attempted to draw out such a caveat
here for two reasons: first, there is no clear reason to believe that the parties will use one particu-
lar extensive form bargaining game over another; second, I want to analyze the effects of fee-
shifting schemes on bargaining, and not on the advantage of one bargaining mechanism over
another.
59. See, e.g., FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 58, at 289.
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legal contexts the parties often have no interaction with one another
until an accident occurs and they already know their private informa-
tion. Moreover, even if the parties were to choose their procedure
"arbitrarily" from the set of feasible mechanisms, moving in the direc-
tion of a winner-pays rule adds numerous high-settlement rate proce-
dures to that feasible set, and as such would increase the probability
that such a procedure will be chosen. Nonetheless, the difficulties in
predicting the exact procedure that parties will choose in practice im-
poses a limitation on this approach (as well as all other bargaining
approaches).
C. Cognitive Barriers to Settlement
Although private information is one plausible barrier to negotia-
tion, it is by no means the sole candidate. In the last decade, experi-
mental psychologists have consistently maintained that barriers to
conflict resolution are substantially rooted in cognitive failures which
are independent of strategic considerations. This logically leads one
to ask whether the arguments above-which are primarily informa-
tion-based-are substantially undercut by other cognitive concerns.
Below I briefly address four plausible psychological barriers to negoti-
ation, and I find that none of them significantly compromises my
above arguments. 60
One such barrier is the so-called "endowment effect," in which a
party's own perception of the value she places on an entitlement (such
as private property or a legal right) is largest when she has a strong
ownership claim over the entitlement.61 The endowment effect can
exacerbate the offer-asking gap in negotiations, thereby forestalling or
defeating settlement efforts. Such phenomena may be especially prev-
alent in litigation contexts, where parties feel either wronged or un-
justly accused, and are therefore less willing to surrender the
opportunity to litigate their competing claims.62 Nonetheless, al-
60. Here I remind the reader that the relevant intellectual exercise is to determine whether
cognitive phenomena contradict, complement, or are unrelated to the arguments in this Article.
So long as psychological barriers do not run contrary to the central thesis of this Article, they do
not compromise the arguments in a systematic way.
61. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990) (finding a robust endowment effect in experiments
involving bargaining over a legal right). The endowment effect is closely related to the notion of
"framing effects," in which the perception of a gamble as one involving losses can lead to greater
risk-taking behavior. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
62. See George Loewenstein & Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the Valuation of
Objects, 7 J. BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 157 (1994) (presenting experimental evidence sug-
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lowing for an endowment effect does not clearly implicate the thesis
of this Article in either direction. If anything, since a loser-pays rule
adds an extra element of moral vindication to a party who prevails in
litigation, the endowment effect may be consistent with the above ar-
guments. Under an American rule or a winner-pays rule, the sense of
moral entitlement is significantly weakened in this regard, and with it
one might expect the endowment effect to be weakened as well.
63
A second psychological barrier to settlement is popularly called
"reactive devaluation," in which individuals tend to be skeptical of a
bargaining proposal or concession when it is communicated by an ad-
versary.64 Such a phenomenon can hinder settlement efforts as well,
as it impedes communication about and coordination around pareto-
improving options. Nonetheless, there are at least two reasons to
doubt that concerns about reactive devaluation significantly undercut
the central thesis of this Article. First, private information might lie at
the very heart of reactive devaluation. Indeed, one reason a party
might be skeptical of her adversary's concession is because such a con-
cession may signal weakness in her adversary's position. Such a con-
clusion is entirely consistent with the game theory literature on
bargaining with incomplete information: strong parties can credibly
signal their strength to their opponent only through displaying a will-
ingness to litigate by making few concessions. 65 Second, to the extent
that reactive devaluation is independent of informational asymme-
tries,66 the MD approach adopted in this Article allows for the use of
a mediator to implement bargaining outcomes. 67 As such, a bargain-
ing mechanism is arguably robust to cognitive devaluation problems,
since the mechanism designer can act as a filter for transmission of
proposals or concessions. 68
gesting that the endowment effect is stronger when a party believes her entitlement was
"earned" rather than a product of chance).
63. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 40, at 1101-02 (making a similar argument with respect
to "divided" entitlements).
64. For a more complete explanation, see Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Con-
flict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389, 394-95 (1991); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psy-
chological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107,
150 (1994).
65. See Robert B. Wilson, Strategic and Informational Barriers to Negotiation, in BARRIERS
TO CONFIUCT RESOLUTION 108, 119 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
66. See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 64, at 155-60 (finding little evidence of either pure
reactive devaluation or strategic use of information in a limited experimental survey).
67. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
68. Indeed, numerous academic writings on cognitive devaluation assume either explicitly
or implicitly that third party involvement with the negotiation process can mitigate or even elim-
inate reactive devaluation. E.g., Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Res-
olution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26, 41-42 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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A third psychological barrier is self-serving overconfidence about
one's prospects. Such overconfidence is commonly the result of sys-
tematic overvaluation of "strong" elements of one's case, and corre-
sponding undervaluation of "weak" or unknown elements.69 This
phenomenon clearly affects settlement rates, since overly confident
assessments of one's prospects in trial can reduce or even eliminate
the potential bargaining surplus created by the prospect of socially
costly litigation.70 Once again, however, this concern need not under-
cut the informational thesis of this Article. Because one component
of optimistic overconfidence is a result of informational asymmetry, 71
institutional changes that affect the stakes associated with private in-
formation may well have similar effects on manifest optimism. Thus,
for example, by making strong plaintiffs even stronger, and weak
plaintiffs even weaker, a loser-pays rule would not only increase the
marginal incentive to bluff, but it also would likely increase the degree
of optimistic overconfidence displayed by the bargaining parties. On
the other hand, a winner-pays rule would likely have the opposite ef-
fect, by undercutting the economic attractiveness of being a strong
party (and even, perhaps, partially obscuring the very definitions of a
"strong" and a "weak").
A fourth plausible psychological barrier to settlment is spite. In-
deed, it could be that-for relational or other reasons-the two par-
ties simply do not like one another. Though the effect of spite on
settlement rates is unclear, it is at least plausible that mutual animus
could retard settlement efforts. 72 Nonetheless, even if such mutual
dislike is prevalent, it is not clear that the underlying fee-shifting rule
would have any systematic effect on the relationship between settle-
ment and mutual dislike.73
69. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in
BARRIERS TO CoNFucr RESOLUTION 44, 46-47 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1995); George
Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 135 (1993).
70. The effect of such overconfidence (though not the precise manifestation) is explored in
much of the early law and economics research on settlement. See supra note 10.
71. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 69, at 47.
72. The ambiguity of the effect on settlement rates stems from the multiple types of animus
that are possible. If the parties display "consequential animus" toward one another (i.e., they
value reducing their adversary's level of wealth or happiness), then one can expect that settle-
ment will often fail. On the other hand, if the parties display mutual "associational animus" (i.e.,
they dislike dealing with one another), then one may well see a desire to settle quickly so as to
minimize the term of the adversarial relationship.
73. It is possible to argue that under a winner-pays rule, a party who dislikes another party
may file an entirely groundless suit so as to costlessly force the defendant into court and induce
him to pay joint legal fees when his defense is successful. However, such a strategy might back-
fire on the plaintiff if she has no provable damages, since the defendant might then have an
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As the brief arguments above suggest, psychological barriers to
successful negotiation, while certainly valuable in their own right,
probably do not systematically affect the strategic analysis underlying
this Article. On the contrary, one can plausibly argue that at least
some of these considerations are in fact complementary to the game-
theoretic analysis employed in the previous sections.
D. Risk Aversion
The analysis above has assumed that plaintiffs and defendants are
neutral toward risk. When either or both parties are risk averse, how-
ever, one should expect these conclusions to change. Indeed, moving
in the direction of a loser-pays rule increases the "stakes" of a case,
while moving toward a winner-pays rule tends to do the opposite.
Consequently, risk-averse parties would (ceteris paribus) be less un-
comfortable with litigating the closer one moves to a winner-pays sys-
tem. Since risk aversion can itself be a reason for settling, there are
plausible situations in which the beneficial effect of risk aversion
under the English rule might swamp the information-chilling charac-
teristics of the rule. At the same time, however, there may be other
situations (such as in litigation between large, well-capitalized entities,
or in class actions) where the actors are sufficiently risk neutral or the
risks are widely pooled so that the effect of risk aversion becomes
second-order in importance.74
E. Other Normative Concerns
Thus far, I have purposely limited my analysis to the positive
question of whether a particular fee-shifting regime facilitates settle-
ment of cases destined for trial. I further noted that because litigation
costs are assumed to be fixed regardless of the parties' respective valu-
ations, a settlement rate maximizing procedure would by definition be
the one that minimizes expected litigation costs. 75 Minimizing such
costs would certainly be an important normative goal. Nonetheless,
incentive to admit liability in court, pay no damages, and force the plaintiff to bear litigation
costs.
74. Moreover, as much of the literature from "prospect theory" suggests, it is not clear that
the parties behave symmetrically with respect to risk. While a plaintiff (who stands to gain from
litigation) may display risk-aversion in her behavior, a defendant (who stands to lose) may fre-
quently behave in a risk-preferring manner. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 10, at 279;
Rachlinsky, supra note 61 (manuscript at 12-19). In fact, Rachlinsky argues that this framing
effect causes individuals to act with a greater revealed preference for risk (and therefore greater
resistance to settlement) under a loser-pays scheme. Id. (manuscript at 72).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
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the myopic pursuit of settlement rate might conflict with other norma-
tive goals that are equally or perhaps more important. As such, the
winner-pays rule is unlikely to emerge as a serious policy candidate. I
outline some of these concerns below.
1. Noncredible Suits
An important issue regarding the robustness of the above model
is the prospect of non-serious plaintiffs. Throughout the preceding
analysis, I have maintained the assumption that all suits occur with
certainty. In other words, bargaining failure invariably gives rise to
litigation. This assumption makes the analysis much more tractable,
and it makes sense if one wishes to confine her attention to how fee-
shifting rules affect bargaining in those cases already selected for liti-
gation. Nonetheless, tractability does not necessarily imply reality,
and in this case the assumption that absent bargaining litigation occurs
with certainty may not be an accurate one. Indeed, as numerous com-
mentators have pointed oUt,7 6 allowing noncredible parties to bargain
can have a significant impact on both the equilibrium offers and suc-
cess rates in the process. Moreover, much of the popular debate with
respect to fee shifting revolves around the argument that a loser-pays
rule will chill the filing of numerous frivolous or low-value suits.
There are two possible responses to the suit credibility issue.
First, it is true that in many types of litigation, such as securities fraud,
it is commonly perceived that there are a number of speculative suits
filed as a byproduct of the low signal-to-noise ratio in market price
fluctuations. It is in such cases that the credibility critique above is
most likely to have "bite." There are, however, other types of cases
(such as airline crashes and toxic torts) in which the inherent stakes
are sufficiently large and obvious to suggest the credibility of suit im-
mediately. Moreover, as Lucian Bebchuk has recently demonstrated,
so long as litigation costs are distributed over time in a sufficiently
diffuse manner, even suits that appear to be noncredible actuarially
may be viewed as credible during negotiations. 77 Either way, the as-
sumption of suit credibility made in the above analysis may not be too
far off.
Second, it is possible to introduce the possibility of such non-seri-
ous plaintiffs into the analysis above. In the interests of space and
76. E.g., Bebchuk, Suing, supra note 6; Katz, supra note 6; Nalebuff, supra note 15.
77. Bebchuk, A New Theory, supra note 6.
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exposition, such an endeavor is not attempted here.78 However, one
can summarize the results of such an attempt in the following three
respects. First, the underlying indemnity regime may have ambiguous
effects on case selection when the plaintiff has private information
about damages rather than the probability of liability. As such, many
of the above results may not be affected much in those situations.
Second, regardless of the effects on plaintiff seriousness, the direct in-
centive effects outlined above are still present among the serious par-
ties: i.e., by signalling a strong case, the defendant may also signal the
likelihood he will have to bear litigation costs, and loser-pays regimes
tend to make the payoffs from strategic overstatement complemen-
tary, and therefore more severe. Finally, the presence of non-serious
plaintiffs might make the defendant less willing, ceteris paribus, to bar-
gain earnestly with the plaintiff, since the defendant is uncertain
whether the plaintiff is attempting to bluff her way to a settlement.
Whether this final factor argues in favor of British, American, winner-
pays, or some other rule is ambiguous. 79 Nonetheless, because a win-
ner-pays rule would almost certainly create an incentive for plaintiffs
with even the most speculative cases to file suit, adopting such a rule
would likely invite strategic costs that outweigh any of the beneficial
settlement-inducing attributes of the rule for serious parties.
2. Deterrence Concerns
A second problem with concentrating myopically on settlement
rates is that one fails to take into account the effect of the fee-shifting
rule on ex ante behavior by potential defendants.80 Indeed, a change
in indemnity rules would almost certainly have distortionary effects on
the parties' respective incentives to invest in safety, more popularly
denoted as "care" decisions81 It is clear that these dynamic invest-
ment considerations can have important consequences with respect to
78. For a more complete analysis, see Eric L. Talley, Bargaining Under Incomplete Infor-
mation and the Design of Legal Rules ch. 3 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University).
79. See id. at 28.
80. Additionally, the analysis above admits a rather perverse set of "comer solutions" in
which the default fee-shifting rule might achieve first best, especially if the court could set fee-
shifting rules to penalize settlement failure, and thereby make litigation extremely unattractive
(and non-credible) to one or both parties. For instance, setting both a and j3 to arbitrarily large
values can lead effectively to punitive effects on defendants, which would almost surely give rise
to efficient settlement. Conversely, setting ax and 3 at arbitrarily small negative values can chill
any suits whatsoever, once again achieving first best outcomes, at least as described by an effi-
ciency metric of settlement rate.




the appropriate choice of a fee-shifting regime. In making her choice
of investment in care, a forward-looking party would take into ac-
count the expected positions (net bargaining) should an injury occur.
This investment concern is an important one, and one that may fur-
ther compromise the relative wisdom of a winner-pays rule.8
2
3. Endogenous Legal Costs
Another question one might have revolves around the assump-
tion that joint legal fees are fixed, or exogenous, at C. In a more real-
istic model, the parties would each choose their privately-borne
litigation costs in the event of bargaining breakdown with knowledge
of the underlying fee-shifting rule. Moreover, one might assert that
because it ignores the endogeneity of legal fees, a winner-pays rule
may give the parties at least a weak incentive to spend inordinate
amounts of money on either (1) wasteful activities; or (2) activities
that actually help the opposing side.
The consideration of endogenous legal fees is also an important
concern. However, there are some plausible arguments that cut in
favor of (rather than against) the arguments in this Article. For in-
stance, it is likely that the loser-pays rule creates more serious distor-
tions in effort level, since such a rule tends to increase one's return to
effort (by forcing the opposing party to subsidize one's expenditure).
8 3
In contrast, a winner-pays rule tends to have the opposite effect of
lowering the return to legal fees, thereby reducing the amount of costs
that the parties run up. Further, because any fee-shifting rule would
likely subject the shifted fees to a reasonableness test, the danger that
a party will heedlessly run up wasteful fees is reduced.
4. Corrective Justice
A fourth normative concern that limits this analysis is corrective
justice. Indeed, part of the popular appeal of a loser-pays rule is that
it forces "negligent" defendants and "frivolous" plaintiffs to make the
other party whole, so that the blameless party need not bear litigation
82. In separate work, I have attempted a first cut at this problem by building a first stage on
the model in which the defendant makes an investment decision before learning his type. I then
attempt to maximize the settlement rate, subject to a "deterrence constraint" for the defendant
-i.e., that the defendant's expected post-settlement payoffs must be within a specific range to
achieve a desired level of deterrence. Talley, supra note 78. I find that while introducing a
deterrence constraint does indeed affect the results of the above model, it is still the case that
relative to the loser-pays rule, one can always find an alternative regime that induced greater
settlement possibilities while inducing the same level of deterrence.
83. See Katz, supra note 6, at 17.
1995]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
costs to vindicate either her rights or her reputation. A winner-pays
rule gives rise to an outcome that is anathema to this normative goal,
in that not only would the blameless party have to bear costs at the
hands of the other, but would in fact have to bear both parties' costs.
Since even a settlement amount would reflect this expectation, a win-
ner-pays rule would be singularly inept at ensuring that blameless par-
ties do not suffer financial harm at the hands of another.
5. Process Concerns
Some have argued that a principal value of any civic institution
(including the courts) is procedural in nature, in that it provides an
opportunity for individuals to participate in the process that creates
law, thereby facilitating greater civic engagement and community rela-
tionships. 84 Others have argued that the process of civil litigation pro-
vides both victims and accused tortfeasors a forum to tell their story.85
These "process" concerns call into question the normative value of
settlement itself, since settlement obviates the necessity of utilizing
the existing institutions for civic participation, thereby chilling the at-
tainment of meaningful participatory inclusion. To the extent that
such concerns govern, then, our normative goal might be more consis-
tent with minimizing rather than maximizing the probability of settle-
ment. Even then, however, the above analysis is helpful, in that it
suggests which procedures might retard settlement (e.g., the English
rule) as a means to achieve greater procedural inclusion. Moreover,
because the above analysis does not envision a settlement rule that
would force parties to settle per se, a procedural choice that facilitates
settlement among privaetely-informed, self-interested individuals
does not necessarily preclude parties with different objectives from
refusing to settle. On the other hand, there is a separate but related
procedural argument that forcing parties to engage in litigation can
provide a "public good" to society by fostering the development of
more reliable and certain legal contours to guide future human behav-
ior.86 If it is in fact desirable for legal rules to reflect such qualities, 87
84. See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
85. See Resnik et al., supra note 9.
86. For one articulation of this argument, see Fiss, supra note 40.
87. Though predictability and certainty are desirable in many circumstances, there may be
other circumstances in which judicial "randomness" can be efficiency-enhancing. See Ayres &
Talley, supra note 40, at 1073-78 (demonstrating that "probabilistic" entitlements are sometimes
cabable of inducing efficient Coasean trade among asymmetrically-informed individuals where
more certain, property-like entitlements are not).
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then perhaps a procedural rule that discourages some settlement pro-
vides the analog of a "Pigouvian" tax on externality-producing settle-
ments, thereby limiting this analysis.
88
IV. CONCLUSION
The analysis above serves two useful purposes. First, it helps to
reconcile and unify many of the existing results on indemnity rules
and settlement. Second, it exposes a quite general, significant poten-
tial cost of the English fee-shifting rule: its deleterious effect on the
settlement of bona fide cases. Because this result is likely to carry
some weight even in the presence of frivolous or noncredible plain-
tiffs, it casts additional doubt on recent efforts to move toward a loser-
pays fee-shifting rule.
As one might expect, a more comprehensive analysis would al-
most surely temper these results. Although a winner-pays system
might be the best for facilitating settlement, it creates severe problems
on various other normative fronts, such as increasing the incidence of
utterly groundless suits. I therefore do not consider it a serious policy
candidate as much as it is a pedagogical exercise to illustrate the im-
prudence of the British rule with respect to settlement.
Additionally, one might extend this analysis to include more gen-
eralized fee-shifting rules. 89 Indeed, the court is often able to observe
more information than liability. For instance, if the court can observe
plaintiff damages, then it may wish to structure the fee-shifting rules
to hinge on both the determination of liability and the level of dam-
ages.90 This added functional dependence can often be tailored to
take advantage of the countervailing incentives phenomenon when
either party (the plaintiff in my model) has private information about
the extent of her damages. Though I have not conducted this analysis
herein, my conjecture is that an optimal rule would require successful
plaintiffs with high damages to pay more in litigation fees than suc-
cessful plaintiffs with low damages.
88. A "Pigouvian tax" is so named in honor of Arthur Pigou, an early twentieth-century
economist who first suggested the efficiency of taxing an externality-producing activity at a level
equal to the value of the negative externality imposed on society. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTER-
MEDIATE MICROECONOMIcs: A MODERN APPROACH 556-57 (3d ed. 1993).
89. Spier's notable analysis makes this attempt in a Rule 68 context, where the indemnity
rule is not a default rule but rather an instrument of the bargaining mechanism. See Spier, supra
note 19.
90. See Bebchuk & Chang, supra note 1, for a proposal that does not incorporate settle-
ment concerns, in which the fee-shifting rule hinges on the winner's margin of victory as well as
her identity.
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Despite these caveats, it is hoped that this Article further under-
scores the complex and often counterintuitive relationship between
procedural rules and private strategic incentives. As such, it counsels
caution in considering the recent seductive invitation to reform our
current indemnity rules in a radical fashion. Perhaps it is an invitation
we ought (for now) to resist.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix derives the expressions shown in Section II of the
text. In this Appendix, I give a somewhat more generalized account
of the distributions of the players' private information. Assume that
instead of uniform distributions, d is distributed according to cumula-
tive distribution function G(d) with associated (strictly positive) den-
sity function g(d), and x is distributed independent of d according to
cumulative distribution function F(x) and associated (strictly positive)
density function f(x). Further, assume that G (d) and F(x) exhibit the
"monotone hazard rate" property from both directions-i.e., G(d)/
g(d) is monotone nondecreasing and [1-G(d)]/g(d) is monotone
nonincreasing in d, and likewise for F(x).
Under the direct revelation mechanism (ps) described in the text,
settlement will not occur with probability [1-p(8,y)]. In such a contin-
gency, the parties will end up in court. Other general mechanism-de-
sign approaches to bargaining assume that bargaining failure implies
that the parties receive their original reservation payoffs, which are
exogenous. 91 Though justified in many bargaining models, such an as-
sumption neglects the prospect that should bargaining fail, the parties
will play a continuation game involving litigation, and as such, rational
parties would update (in a Bayesian fashion) their expectations of trial
outcome conditional on bargaining failure. In order to address this
possibility, I define a Bernoulli random variable Z which takes on the
value of z=1 with probability p(dx) (i.e., should the parties settle),
and a value of z=O with probability [1-p(dx)] (i.e., should the parties
end up in court). Applying Bayes theorem, it is easily verified that,
conditional on the mechanism mandating litigation (rather than settle-




I* { x I d, z=O} = (8)
J[1-p(d,x )]dF(x )
x





=*E { d x,z=O } = (9)
df [1-p(dx)]dG(d)
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Using the above definitions to redefine the failure-contingent
continuation payoffs, one can derive the expected gain that the bar-
gaining mechanism confers on each party over her reservation utility
(under, of course, the condition that the other party truthfully reveals
her type-a condition that will be confirmed in equilibrium):
u,(8 Id)= f {p(6,x)s(,x)-p(6,x)[x(d+rlC)-(1-3)C]} dF(x) (10)
d
ua(Y Ix) = J {-P(d'y)s(d'y) +p(d,y). [x(d+rjC) + f3C] } dG(d), (11)
where i = (cs-P3). The above expressions are the integral equivalents
of equations (3) and (4) in the text.
Consider first the incentive compatibility constraints on the
choice of mechanism. Recall that the revelation principle allows one
to confine analysis to bargaining mechanisms that involve truth-telling
in equilibrium. Using the envelope theorem and the well-known "sin-
gle crossing" property, one can show that the bargaining mechanism is
incentive compatible for players t and A if and only if the following
conditions hold almost everywhere:
(i) Ex{x.p(dx) } is nonincreasing in d;
(ii) Ed{d+irC).p(dx)} is nondecreasing in x; (12)
(iii) u,,,(d)=-Ex-p(dx) };
(iv) u,(x)=Ed{ (d + T1C).p(d,x)}.
Conditions (iii) and (iv) are standard, and can be derived directly by
the envelope theorem-i.e., taking a first order derivative of each
agent's net utility function and imposing the first order condition for
truth-telling. Note that conditions (iii) and (iv) are identical to equa-
tions (6) and (7) in the text. To show condition (i), consider two plain-
tiff types, d & d' where d' > d. Using the definition of the plaintiff's
gain from bargaining, incentive compatibility implies u,(d I d) >
u.(d' I d), or:
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u.(d Id) =-E. {p (dx)s(dx)-p (dx) [x(d+ tjC) -(1-P3) C] }
> Ex{p(d',x)s(d',x)-p(d',x)[x+(d+rC)-(1-fP)C] }=-u(d' Id) (13)
Writing down a similar expression for u (d'I d') _ u(d I d'), and taking
differences, the following condition emerges:
(d'-d).Ex {p (dx)x} _(d'-d).E{p (d',x) .x} (14)
Dividing through by (d'-d) > 0, condition (i) emerges. An analogous
technique applies to the derivation of condition (ii).
By integrating expressions (i) and (ii), and then adding them, it is
possible to get a global condition that combines both incentive com-
patibility and individual rationality constraints (i.e., that the players'
net payoffs from truth-telling and participation be nonnegative). Ex-
plicitly, there exists a settlement transfer function s(dx) such that (p,s)
is incentive compatible and individually rational if and only if
E.{x.p(d,x)} is nonincreasing in d, Ed{[d+lC].p(dx)} is
nondecreasing in x, and:
dxJ -,Y J { (s~) - (8+rIC). ft j , dF('y)dG (5) O (15)
The proof of this equation is straightforward, and is therefore
omitted. 2 Note, however, that because the second and third terms in
the square brackets are both negative, only if litigation costs are suffi-
ciently large will a given settlement rule p(dx) be feasible. Moreover,
note that the fee-shifting parameters a and 03 enter only through r1 =
(x-p3), and 1 enters negatively in the above conditions. Thus, the
larger the value of (a-P3), the more restricted is the mechanism de-
signer's choice of settlement rules.
92. See Talley, supra note 78.
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